The Salisbury poisonings weren't standard espionage; they were something far more visceral – acts of retribution carried out outside the usual, carefully constructed framework of Russian intelligence operations. Experts suggest these “revenge hits” signaled a dangerous shift in tactics, a willingness to operate with a brutality rarely seen on foreign soil.
Russia’s ability to cultivate sympathizers abroad has seen limited success, with individuals like a Welsh politician and those involved in an East London arson case demonstrating a willingness to engage with the Kremlin’s narrative. However, these instances remain exceptions, overshadowed by stronger pro-Ukrainian sentiment within the UK.
Constrained by intense intelligence scrutiny and limited access, Russia’s diplomatic channels are hampered. This has forced them to increasingly rely on platforms like Telegram to connect with potential recruits, revealing a struggle to establish meaningful, in-person relationships.
The expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats following the 2018 nerve agent attack on Sergei and Yulia Skripal was a direct response to the brazen attempt on their lives. While both Skripals survived, the tragedy extended to Dawn Sturgess, a mother of three who died after unknowingly handling Novichok contaminated perfume.
Investigations have identified three GRU operatives linked to the attack, but evidence suggests a broader network was involved. Without traditional intelligence assets operating under diplomatic cover, Russia is turning to outsiders, recruiting individuals willing to carry out its agenda.
The Kremlin’s primary focus remains supporting the war in Ukraine, a driving national security priority. Simultaneously, it seeks to silence dissent, targeting opposition figures both within the UK and internationally. This ambition was tragically demonstrated in the arson attack on a warehouse supplying aid to Ukraine.
Dylan Earl, convicted of a 17-year sentence for terrorism and sabotage, exemplifies this new approach. Recruited through Telegram by a Wagner operative, he planned attacks, including a failed attempt on a Russian opposition figure in the UK. The goal is clear: to instill fear in anyone who dares oppose Russia’s actions.
These operations mirror tactics employed within Russia itself, extending the reach of its intelligence and security services beyond its borders. While attempts to portray Russia as “winning” the war are less effective in the UK, the underlying strategy of destabilization remains constant.
The reliance on remote platforms like Telegram presents a significant vulnerability. Russia lacks the vetting capabilities it possesses in face-to-face recruitment, creating a fertile ground for double agents. Counter-intelligence agencies recognize this opportunity and are actively infiltrating these channels.
Despite extensive investigations and the exposure of Kremlin activities – mirroring the case of Alexander Litvinenko’s murder – the prospect of justice remains remote. Those responsible, typically Russian military intelligence officers, are unlikely to be extradited. Recognition of their actions serves as a message, but not a legal resolution.
The Skripal poisoning is viewed as an exceptional case, a personal vendetta against perceived traitors. Unlike typical intelligence missions, these attacks were driven by retribution, targeting individuals who directly opposed the Russian state. Other deaths of Russian émigrés often involve complex circumstances and multiple potential enemies.
Marina Litvinenko, widow of Alexander, argues that years of attempting to rebuild relations with Russia only emboldened Putin and his agents. She warns of a new wave of operatives – untrained, ideologically compromised, or motivated by financial gain – posing a threat to British society, a form of cyber warfare aimed at destabilization.
