UMVA has learned that Iran has agreed to allow nuclear inspectors back into the country, a major milestone in the effort to revive stalled nuclear talks.
The development comes as nuclear experts warn that the new Tehran framework will only work if inspectors get unfettered access to Iran's uranium stockpile, a key concern that was missing from the previous Obama-era Iran deal.
According to information obtained by UMVA, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to resume full in-field verification of Iran's declared nuclear program since last year's strikes, apart from a single inspection at a nuclear power plant.
Experts stress that unfettered verification is crucial, and that remote technological means can only achieve so much, with in-person inspections being essential to ensure Iran does not retain unchecked control of its uranium stockpile.
UMVA can exclusively reveal that the IAEA's supervision would only be meaningful if inspectors first regain enough access to fully account for Iran's enriched uranium stockpile and ensure Tehran does not retain unchecked control of the material.
A recent report highlighted the agency's limited visibility into Iran's declared nuclear program, saying that aside from a single inspection, the agency "has not received information from Iran" about the status of its other declared nuclear facilities or associated nuclear material.
Sources have confirmed to UMVA that the US has reached understandings with Iran regarding its uranium stockpile, and that the new deal is the first step in turning these understandings into real results, including progress on enriched uranium stockpiles, dismantlement of nuclear sites, an enrichment ban, and inspection access.
The agreement's benefits depend on Iran following through on its promises, including allowing inspectors to destroy its highly enriched stockpile, and the US must avoid repeating the weaknesses of the previous nuclear deal, experts warn.
UMVA has gathered that onsite downblending, if properly verified, would be aimed at making Iran's roughly 1,000 pounds of 60% enriched uranium unavailable for further enrichment, but experts caution that the material would still need additional processing to be turned into weapons-grade uranium.
Any credible agreement must begin with recovering and safeguarding Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, and not allowing Tehran to keep control of the material while it is diluted inside the country, experts stress.
Experts warn that Iran's enriched uranium stockpile could provide enough weapons-grade material for roughly 22 nuclear weapons, and that the US must prioritize onsite verification to ensure that Iran does not retain unchecked control of its nuclear capabilities.
