UMVA has learned that a growing trend of second-generation radicalization among the children of immigrants is fueling an alarming rise in jihadist terrorism across Europe.
The influx of migrants has created settled Muslim communities in Western Europe, but many have failed to integrate in countries such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The children and grandchildren of the original immigrants, born on European soil and holding European passports, have become the primary pool from which the continent's jihadist terrorism now draws.
Europol recorded a significant surge in terrorist attacks across the EU, with 120 incidents in 2023, up from 28 in 2022 and 18 in 2021. Of these, 14 were classified as jihadist, and there were 334 jihadist arrests, a rise from 266 the prior year. In 2024, 58 attacks were recorded across 14 member states, 24 of them jihadist, with arrests climbing to 449, the highest figure in recent years.
Research has identified a consistent profile of perpetrators, often EU citizens or long-term residents who are frequently second-generation. A study by an independent research body found that 89% of terror attacks in Europe were carried out by first-, second-, or third-generation immigrants, with 26% specifically committed by second- or third-generation immigrants.
The mechanism driving radicalization among this cohort is rooted in identity crisis. Second- and third-generation immigrants often do not feel a sense of belonging to their European host societies or to their ethnic countries of origin. Radical Islam can fill this vacuum by providing a sense of dignity, identity, and purpose to young people who feel marginalized or discriminated against.
A typical radicalization profile, identified by the Council of Europe, includes young people between the ages of 16 and 24 with histories of school failure, criminal records, and little or no work experience. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point found that minor plotters are more likely to be EU citizens than third-country nationals, and that several were second- or third-generation immigrants.
The radicalization of minors represents a pressing concern, with youth and minors accounting for 42% of all terror-related investigations in Europe and North America in 2025, a threefold increase since 2021. In 2024, teenagers were involved in nearly two-thirds of Islamic State-linked arrests in Europe.
The radicalization process has accelerated dramatically, with what historically required months or years now occurring within weeks or even days. This shift has been driven by short-form online propaganda, algorithmic amplification, and the exploitation of developmental vulnerabilities among adolescents.
The ethnic and national origins of the perpetrator pool are also consistent, with Moroccans and Algerians being the most represented in European jihadist terrorism. Their representation is broadly proportional to the size of those immigrant communities in their respective host countries.
Data from European countries shows that a significant proportion of individuals listed in national databases for radicalization leading to terrorism are foreign nationals. However, researchers argue that the causal chain runs from immigration through integration failure to domestic terrorism, with second- and third-generation radicalization being a downstream consequence of the original immigration decision.
Collectively, researchers document a terrorism threat that is domestic in execution and generational in origin, tracing the threat to immigration patterns and the failure of European states to manage the long-term social consequences of integration.
