A critical impasse hangs over the nation as the Department of Homeland Security nears its second month without full funding, even as Congress enjoys an extended Easter and Passover recess. Frustration mounts, and a familiar question echoes: can the President force lawmakers back to Washington?
The Constitution grants the President the power to convene Congress under “extraordinary Occasions,” a seemingly straightforward authority. However, history reveals this power isn’t a guaranteed path to legislative action. It’s a tool, not a command, and its effectiveness hinges on a complex interplay of constitutional principles and parliamentary procedure.
President George Washington first invoked this power in 1791, summoning the Senate to address appointments and the impending statehood of Vermont. Later, Abraham Lincoln called Congress back into session following the devastating attack on Fort Sumter, a moment undeniably steeped in crisis.
The most recent instance occurred in 1948, when President Harry Truman, facing inaction on key domestic policies, famously called a “Turnip Day Session.” He hoped to spur action on education, energy, and housing, but met with resistance, ultimately earning Congress the label of “Do Nothing.”
The core issue isn’t simply *if* a President can call Congress back, but *when* circumstances qualify as “extraordinary.” The Constitution offers little clarity, leaving the definition open to interpretation – and political maneuvering. What constitutes a crisis is often a matter of perspective.
Currently, the prolonged funding lapse for Homeland Security certainly feels like a crisis. Yet, a surprising constitutional hurdle may prevent President Trump from intervening. The power to convene Congress may be limited by how Congress itself defines its own sessions.
The Constitution explicitly states that each chamber “may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” Currently, both the House and Senate are technically holding brief, almost symbolic sessions every few days. This allows them to argue they are *not* in recess, and therefore not subject to the President’s call.
This isn’t a new tactic. A similar situation arose during the Obama administration, when the President attempted to use “recess appointments” to fill positions at the National Labor Relations Board. The Supreme Court, in the 2014 case *NLRB v. Canning*, decisively sided with Congress.
The Court affirmed Congress’s ultimate authority to define its own session schedule. As Justice Stephen Breyer wrote, “the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that…it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.” If Congress declares itself in session, it *is* in session, regardless of presidential opinion.
The current parliamentary situation mirrors the conditions that led to the *Canning* decision. Despite calls for intervention, President Trump appears unable to compel Congress’s return. Even attempts to pass funding measures during these brief “pro forma” sessions, as recently demonstrated by Senate leadership, highlight Congress’s control.
The hope for a “Turnip Day Session” – a dramatic presidential intervention – seems unlikely to materialize. Under the Constitution, and as affirmed by the Supreme Court, Congress holds the power to determine its own schedule, effectively shielding itself from a forced return to Washington.
