The Supreme Court's decision to let stand a lower court's ruling in a defamation case has been met with criticism from two of its conservative justices, who argue that the high court missed an opportunity to revisit a decades-old precedent.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, in a dissenting opinion, effectively called on their colleagues to revisit the "actual malice" standard, which has been used to evaluate defamation claims against public figures. They argue that this standard is not rooted in the Constitution and was created in a landmark 1964 decision.
The case at issue involves attorney Alan Dershowitz, who claimed that CNN deceptively edited a snippet of his defense during Trump's first impeachment trial to make it sound like he said the opposite of what he actually meant. Dershowitz argued that CNN's actions damaged his reputation and sought to use the court's defamation precedent to hold the network accountable.
Thomas and Gorsuch, in their dissenting opinion, pointed to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which established the "actual malice" standard for public figures. They argued that this standard is an "impossible" burden to overcome and should be revisited.
The justices' criticism echoes concerns raised by President Donald Trump, who has called for loosening U.S. libel laws and has frequently singled out CNN for criticism. Dershowitz, who has represented Trump, O.J. Simpson, and Leona Helmsley, among others, has also been vocal in his criticism of the majority's ruling.
The Sullivan case arose after a Montgomery, Alabama, commissioner sued the Times for libel over a full-page advertisement criticizing how the city treated civil rights protesters. The Supreme Court later reversed the ruling, holding that a public official cannot prevail in a defamation case unless he proves the statement was made with "actual malice."
Thomas and Gorsuch argued that the "actual-malice standard" bears no relation to the Constitution and pointed to the Sedition Act of 1798, which imposed a lower threshold for defamatory statements about public officials. They suggested that the founding generation believed public figures had stronger claims for damages when they were defamed.
