The Bretton Woods Conference marked the beginning of a hopeful era following the devastation of World War II. Major European powers and the United States embraced democratization and demilitarization, reflecting on the war’s lessons and integrating them into their national identities.
China’s experience stands in stark contrast. The War of Resistance against Japan blurred into a brutal Civil War, and the subsequent Mao era severely restricted reflection on the conflict, particularly any acknowledgment of the Nationalist government’s contributions.
It wasn't until the 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, that China began to reinterpret the war, aiming to heal divisions from the Cultural Revolution and forge a new sense of national pride. Today, the Chinese Communist Party frequently leverages anti-Japanese sentiment to ignite patriotism.
Rana Mitter’s book, “China’s Good War,” delves into Chinese historiography and cultural representations of World War II, a period often overlooked. He explores how collective memory of the war clashes with China’s past and reveals insights into its present.
Mitter, a renowned expert in contemporary Chinese politics, explains that the book’s central message draws a parallel to Studs Terkel’s “The Good War,” highlighting the irony of portraying World War II as a virtuous event while acknowledging the prejudice faced by African American soldiers fighting for the U.S.
He spent years across China, discovering diverse memories of the war—a significant period often forgotten—where over eight million Chinese perished and millions more became refugees.
Mitter argues that sustaining the memory of World War II as a heroic event has become a key task for the Chinese Communist Party, shaping China’s identity today.
He defines “new nationalism” as a nationalism that includes a former political enemy, a unique challenge for the Party, as the Nationalist government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was in power during WWII.
The 1980s proved a pivotal turning point. Following the Cultural Revolution, China’s new leaders sought a new national ideology and encouraged historians to reopen WWII archives, moving beyond a narrow focus on the Communist role.
This shift led to broader discussions about the war’s significance, incorporating stories previously suppressed, such as those involving Chiang Kai-shek and foreign assistance.
Geopolitically, rewriting history aimed to foster reconciliation with Taiwan, as unification was a key goal. While initially successful, this tactic proved less effective as Taiwan democratized and adopted a more autonomous vision.
Mitter notes that the Party manages this historical flexibility through omission rather than fabrication, selectively presenting facts to support its narrative. For example, Chinese delegates at the San Francisco UN Charter signing are referred to simply as “representatives of China,” omitting their Nationalist affiliation.
The Party’s use of WWII history in diplomacy is effective domestically and with authoritarian allies, but less so in the Western world, particularly regarding claims of China’s central role in the United Nations.
He observes that nostalgia for the war echoes nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution, both complex and powerful, revealing the difficulty in finding unifying narratives in China’s modern history.
Ultimately, the emphasis on ancient Chinese civilization reflects a desire for a shared identity, as the complexities of WWII and the Cultural Revolution remain deeply divisive.
