A ripple of reaction spread across the globe as the United States unveiled its new National Security Strategy. Russia welcomed it with open arms, while European allies expressed deep concern, and Gulf monarchies found reason to celebrate. But in the vast expanse of Asia – the region Washington calls the Indo-Pacific – a different sentiment took hold: a growing unease.
The document contains reassuring words, promising military strength in critical areas like the Taiwan Strait and a commitment to preventing any single power from dominating the South China Sea. It pledges to defend the balance of power and combat unfair economic practices – priorities keenly felt throughout the Indo-Pacific. Many breathed a sigh of relief, seeing a restatement of commitments after a period of uncertainty.
Yet, beneath the surface of these assurances lies a fundamental shift in perspective. The strategy feels…constructed, as if vital pledges have been added as an afterthought to a core ideology that threatens to steer American policy in a dramatically different direction. It’s a startlingly ideological document, extending familiar domestic obsessions far beyond American borders.
The “America First” mindset, with its focus on borders, skepticism towards diversity initiatives, and denial of climate change, is now being projected onto the world stage. This isn’t simply a change in policy; it’s a corrosion of the very soft power that has historically been one of America’s greatest assets. Illiberalism and xenophobia, it seems, are being embraced without acknowledging their damaging effects.
The most dangerous export of this ideology, for the security of the Indo-Pacific, is a growing disdain for the liberal international order. For decades, America has defined its global role by championing liberal democracy and the benefits of a rules-based system – a system that, while imperfect, fostered shared prosperity for both Americans and their partners.
The new strategy marks a decisive break from this tradition. While the security of the Indo-Pacific remains a stated priority, it’s no longer framed as essential for the region’s freedom and openness, or for maintaining a system that benefits all. Instead, a far more limited and precarious connection is being forged: deterring China is now primarily linked to bolstering Big Tech profits, securing vital resources, and forcing production back home.
This connection is fragile, vulnerable to the whims of political expediency. A temptation exists to believe that cooperation with China won’t come at a short-term cost, while confronting Beijing’s ambitions in Asia might. Recent decisions, like allowing the sale of advanced chips to China in exchange for revenue, are deeply unsettling – a signal that immediate financial gain can outweigh long-term strategic interests.
The president’s well-known mercantilist instincts are on full display. The strategy also reveals a belief in a throwback concept: spheres of influence. The document acknowledges that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This isn’t just a concession to Russia’s revanchist ambitions; it opens the door for China as well.
Why not allow China a sphere of influence in Asia, if it secures a favorable economic deal? Beijing might eventually break its promises, but that will be a problem for future administrations. This is a calculated gamble, prioritizing short-term gains over long-term stability and the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
For years, a bipartisan consensus in Washington recognized China as a systemic rival, not merely an economic competitor. But the current policymakers operate from a different set of assumptions, prioritizing domestic economic considerations above all else. They don’t fear losing global leadership; they may even welcome the dismantling of existing economic arrangements, as long as it mitigates the economic shocks of China’s rise.
The silences within this document speak volumes. An administration that intimidates businesses, politicizes technology, protects its domestic markets, and weaponizes trade is unlikely to view the Chinese system as a genuine ideological threat. This realization is what truly unnerves Asian capitals.
The unsettling truth is this: there’s a growing possibility that MAGA’s ideologues and populists will eventually decide that granting Beijing dominance over Asia won’t harm jobs or profits in the United States. And on that day, they may simply stand aside, abandoning the defense of the Indo-Pacific to its fate.
