Within Iran’s complex power structure, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stands as the unwavering pillar supporting the ruling regime. More than just a military force, it’s the personal guard of Ayatollah Khamenei, encompassing ground, naval, and air forces, alongside the internal Basij militia and the clandestine Qods Force.
The Qods Force operates in the shadows, executing covert operations beyond Iran’s borders. These aren’t simply acts of deterrence; they are calculated moves to project Iranian influence, particularly among Shia populations, and destabilize adversaries throughout the Middle East, often employing asymmetric and terrorist tactics.
Iran extends its reach globally through the IRGC, providing crucial support – training, funding, and weaponry – to a network of partner militias and proxy groups. This allows Iran to exert influence across multiple conflict zones while maintaining a degree of separation, a carefully constructed veil of plausible deniability.
The IRGC boasts a formidable force of between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel, with the Qods Force comprised of 5,000 to 15,000 meticulously selected individuals known for their unwavering loyalty. While based in Iran, their focus has intensified in Iraq and Syria, with operations extending worldwide.
Targets include U.S., Israeli, Saudi, and UAE interests, as well as Iranian dissidents. The Qods Force doesn’t hesitate to collaborate with criminal networks to achieve its objectives, and has consistently supplied advanced weaponry to its proxies – air defense systems, missiles, drones, and improvised explosive devices.
Recent events vividly illustrate this support: weapons and training provided by the IRGC were directly used by the Houthis throughout 2024 to launch attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, disrupting global trade and escalating tensions.
The regime’s very survival is intertwined with the IRGC’s existence. Eliminating the Guard would leave the ayatollah vulnerable, potentially collapsing the entire system and severing the lifeline to its regional proxies, diminishing their power and influence.
However, dismantling the IRGC is far from a simple military operation. Experts warn of a dangerous gamble, suggesting the organization wouldn’t simply dissolve if the clerical leadership fell. Instead, it could shed its religious guise and emerge as a ruthless military dictatorship, seizing control.
Intelligence reports from early 2026 reveal the IRGC has already developed contingency plans to position itself as the only force capable of preventing chaos, rebranding as a stabilizing authority in a collapsing state. This calculated move highlights their ambition and adaptability.
Furthermore, fracturing the IRGC risks unleashing a wave of violence. The organization could splinter into heavily armed factions, dispersing across the Middle East and potentially launching terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies.
The economic implications are equally daunting. The IRGC isn’t just a military entity; it’s a massive economic conglomerate, controlling an estimated 30 to 40 percent of Iran’s economy – including vital sectors like ports, telecommunications, and construction.
A successor government would likely remain financially dependent on these IRGC networks without a comprehensive plan to disentangle the economy. This dependence would perpetuate the cycle of economic instability, as capital flight is already accelerating, with over $400 million in Tether leaving Iran between December 2025 and January 2026.
Removing the IRGC, or even targeting its senior leaders, carries a significant “blind fire” risk. The breakdown of central command could empower the organization’s 32 regional divisions to act independently, potentially unleashing a dangerous arsenal.
Thousands of precision-guided missiles and smart mines positioned along the Strait of Hormuz could fall into the hands of local commanders, who might sell them to non-state actors or use them as leverage for their own escape. The potential for catastrophic escalation is undeniable.
Even if removed from power, the IRGC could simply transform into a “ghost proxy,” retreating into remote mountainous regions or across borders, continuing to operate its network of proxies as a private mercenary force, effectively remaining a destabilizing force.
Recent reports confirm the IRGC has already deployed nearly 5,000 Iraqi and Afghan fighters to suppress domestic protests, demonstrating a willingness to treat its own population as a battlefield and rely on foreign militias for survival. This chilling tactic underscores their ruthlessness.
While dismantling the IRGC might reduce support for groups like the Houthis, Hamas, and Hizballah, it could simultaneously create a fragmented landscape of independent terrorist organizations comprised of former IRGC members, perpetuating regional instability and posing a continued threat.
