A palpable sense of unease is growing within China regarding the United States. Recent surveys reveal a consistently low level of public sentiment, with opinions hovering around a concerning 37 out of 100 during the latter half of 2025. This isn’t simply a matter of indifference; it’s a deepening perception of the U.S. as a potential adversary.
The feeling of threat is escalating. Over three-quarters of the Chinese public – 73% – now view the United States as a danger to China’s national security, a significant increase from 61% just months prior. This isn’t a generalized fear, but one sharply focused on specific concerns: Taiwan and the stability of international trade dominate anxieties.
Despite this apprehension, a surprising element emerges. The Chinese public doesn’t believe cooperation with the U.S. is impossible, or even undesirable. Strong majorities still identify mutual interests in crucial areas like economic collaboration, ensuring global security, and driving technological innovation – the very arenas where competition is most intense.
This presents a complex picture. While Beijing is clearly receiving public support to directly address points of contention with Washington, the traditional avenues of fostering goodwill – cultural exchange and educational programs – are surprisingly low on the list of shared priorities. A shift in approach seems to be underway.
This shift is underscored by a willingness to respond in kind to perceived American restrictions. A significant portion of the Chinese population favors mirroring U.S. policies and limiting American access to China, should restrictions on Chinese citizens in the United States continue. This suggests a growing expectation of reciprocity, and a diminished appetite for one-sided openness.
The roots of this evolving sentiment stretch back over a decade. The Obama administration’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, perceived as a move to contain China’s economic growth, marked an early turning point. This was followed by escalating trade disputes and the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic under the Trump administration, an era characterized by assertive Chinese diplomacy.
Even with attempts at balance from the Biden administration, tensions persisted. Tariffs remained, export controls tightened, and a renewed trade war ignited. These ongoing difficulties, extending into areas like student visas and the race for artificial intelligence dominance, have contributed to the current climate of distrust.
Income appears to play a role in shaping perceptions. While negative sentiment is widespread, those with higher incomes tend to view the United States more favorably, though even this group shows a decline in positive feelings. This suggests economic factors and global engagement may influence perspectives.
The perception of threat isn’t evenly distributed either. While consistent across genders and educational levels, it’s notably lower among the wealthiest segment of the population. This highlights the nuanced ways in which different groups within China are processing the relationship with the U.S.
Despite the prevailing negativity, the desire for collaboration remains. Beyond the core areas of rivalry, significant portions of the Chinese public see common ground in public health, a testament to shared vulnerabilities and the need for collective solutions. However, education lags far behind, reflecting recent challenges faced by Chinese students and scholars in the United States.
The issue of visas is particularly sensitive. With a quarter of all international students in the U.S. originating from China, any perceived threat to their access is met with a strong desire for reciprocal measures. A plurality of the Chinese public supports restricting American access to China in response to similar restrictions imposed on Chinese citizens.
Ultimately, the survey reveals a paradox: the Chinese public views the United States as a threat, yet simultaneously recognizes the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. This suggests a desire for direct engagement on difficult issues, rather than a retreat into isolation. Addressing concerns surrounding Taiwan and trade directly will be crucial for any potential shift in public opinion.
The research involved a detailed survey of over 2,500 Chinese adults, carefully balanced to reflect the nation’s demographic makeup. A preliminary survey was conducted to refine questions and ensure accuracy, providing a solid foundation for the core findings. The survey took an average of just over 16 minutes to complete.
