In the wake of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death, a wave of mourning – and protest – erupted in a nation thousands of miles from Iran: Nigeria. Within hours of the news, members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, known as the IMN, took to the streets in cities across the country, waving Iranian flags and portraits of the deceased leader.
The IMN is no accidental ally of Tehran. Founded in 1978 by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, the organization was deliberately modeled on Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Zakzaky himself traveled to Iran in the 1980s, meeting Ayatollah Khomeini and returning with a mission: to establish a Khomeinist movement in northern Nigeria.
For over four decades, a sustained ideological relationship has flourished between the IMN and the Iranian government. The movement, boasting an estimated four million followers spread across nearly all of Nigeria’s states, operates schools and maintains a paramilitary security wing, solidifying its presence and influence.
Sheikh Zakzaky’s formal statement following Khamenei’s death was scathing, labeling the act a “terrorist aggression” perpetrated by the United States and Israel. He framed the killing not merely as a loss for the Islamic world, but as an attack on all of humanity, predicting it would ultimately strengthen, not weaken, the faith.
The outpouring of grief wasn’t confined to the IMN. In Kano, even followers of the Qadiriyya Sufi order participated in Salatul Ghaib, a traditional funeral prayer performed for the deceased in absentia, demonstrating a wider resonance of Iranian influence within Nigeria’s religious landscape.
The IMN’s geographic heartland is particularly sensitive. Its headquarters in Zaria, Kaduna State, sits at the crossroads of intense religious and ethnic tensions. The region borders Plateau State, a hotspot for jihadist attacks on Christian communities, and lies within Kaduna State, where mass killings of Christians have also occurred.
However, it’s crucial to understand the distinctions between the IMN and other extremist groups operating in Nigeria. While both share hostility towards the West and Israel, groups like Lakurawa and the Islamic State–Sahel Province are Salafi-jihadist organizations aligned with ISIS, not Iran. Their ideologies and command structures are fundamentally different.
The IMN’s history has been largely defined by clashes with Nigerian security forces. In 2019, the Nigerian government officially banned the organization, citing attacks on soldiers, police officers, and the destruction of property. A particularly violent confrontation in Abuja resulted in multiple deaths on both sides, raising concerns about the group’s escalating trajectory.
The annual observance of Quds Day, established by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, serves as a potent example of Iran’s deliberate projection of influence. This officially sanctioned Iranian event calls for global solidarity with Palestinians and opposition to Israel, and the IMN’s annual marches in Nigeria are a direct manifestation of this strategy.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, named after the same source as Quds Day, is the arm responsible for cultivating and supporting proxy networks abroad. These include groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and, increasingly, organizations like the IMN.
Reports indicate that the IRGC has actively worked to strengthen the IMN. Intelligence suggests the establishment of training centers for Zakzaky’s militants in Kano and Sokoto, part of a broader Iranian strategy to expand its reach across West Africa. Zakzaky’s personal meeting with Khamenei in 2024 underscored the depth of this relationship.
Despite its proscribed status, the IMN continues to operate openly in at least seven northern states and even in Lagos. The swift and organized mobilization following Khamenei’s death – thousands marching through city centers, coordinated statements from regional leaders – occurred with apparent impunity, raising questions about enforcement.
Analysts warn that continued state repression coupled with ongoing Iranian support could push the IMN towards a more violent phase of radicalization, potentially triggering a Shia insurgency directly supported by the IRGC and Hezbollah. The movement, for now, remains Iran’s primary ideological and political foothold in Nigeria.
The scenes following Khamenei’s death – children marching alongside adults, flags of opposing nations dragged through the streets – are a stark reminder that Iran’s investment in Nigeria is not a fleeting moment, but a long-term, multigenerational project.
