The question of whether China could successfully wage war in the Taiwan Strait is a complex one, fraught with political uncertainties. But setting aside the question of *if* and *when*, a crucial assessment remains: could the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) actually *prevail* on the battlefield, assuming intervention from the United States and Japan?
Any intervention by Japan is inextricably linked to the United States. Neither nation possesses the independent capability to act alone; a combined effort, or none at all, is the likely scenario. Understanding the potential strength of a U.S.-Japan force is therefore paramount to evaluating the PLA’s prospects.
The U.S. Air Force currently operates around 2,000 combat aircraft, a number expected to remain stable as older models are replaced by the advanced F-35. While these aircraft are globally dispersed, a significant concentration exists in the Indo-Pacific region, overseen by the 5th, 7th, and 11th Air Forces stationed in Japan, South Korea, and Alaska/Hawaii/Guam respectively.
Roughly 400 fighters could be deployed to the region, bolstered by Marine Corps F-35Bs and additional wings from the U.S. mainland. Combined with Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force, boasting over 300 fighters, a formidable force of over 600 aircraft could be assembled – a force increasingly dominated by the cutting-edge F-35.
Initial deployment wouldn’t be to vulnerable frontline bases like Okinawa. Instead, U.S. and Japanese aircraft would likely stage from locations like the southern Philippines, Japan’s main islands, and Guam, awaiting the outcome of the initial naval clash. The fate of that naval battle would dictate the next phase of the air campaign.
The U.S. Navy maintains a fleet of approximately ten aircraft carriers, with at least three consistently deployed. In a crisis, five could be mobilized, with three – accompanied by over 30 surface combatants and 20 nuclear submarines – potentially directed towards a Taiwan contingency. These forces would primarily operate in the vast expanse of the Philippine Sea, maximizing maneuverability.
The PLA Navy is rapidly modernizing, aiming for three aircraft carriers, 60 destroyers, 50 frigates, and 40 nuclear submarines by the late 2020s. However, a direct comparison is misleading. Naval warfare is incredibly intricate, and a simple “numbers game” overlooks critical capability gaps.
The PLA Navy’s carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, are outmatched by U.S. Nimitz-class carriers in terms of sortie generation. Even the newer Fujian lags behind. To compensate, the PLA must leverage advantages in subsystems – advanced fighters like the J-35 and J-15T, long-range missiles, and airborne early-warning aircraft.
The PLA Navy’s carriers would likely operate roughly 1,000 kilometers from the Chinese mainland, relying on land-based air support. However, their flanks would be vulnerable to attacks from Japan and the Philippines, requiring constant protection from destroyers, frigates, and submarines. U.S. and Japanese submarines, operating in the deep waters of the Western Pacific, pose a significant threat.
The U.S. has been actively rebuilding its presence in the Philippines, securing access to vital ports and airfields. These facilities would be crucial staging grounds for a sustained campaign. The PLA Navy would essentially be operating in an encircled battlespace, demanding an extremely high tempo of operations for survival.
To overcome these disadvantages, the PLA Navy would require a significantly larger carrier fleet – at least five, even under conservative estimates – to reduce reliance on stretched land-based aviation and gain operational flexibility. Expanding its long-range fighter capabilities, particularly with the J-35 and J-20, is also essential.
While the PLA’s missile forces are substantial, their effectiveness is contingent on securing airspace and receiving real-time intelligence – a task reliant on air superiority. Hypersonic missiles are potent, but their utility diminishes without carrier presence and robust air support.
Ultimately, a committed U.S.-Japan intervention would present a formidable challenge to the PLA. It would force China to divert immense resources and likely result in a protracted, high-attrition conflict. The PLA’s ability to break through the Bashi Channel and Miyako Strait, heavily blockaded by opposing forces, remains a critical, and potentially devastating, hurdle.
